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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the issue of crash certification by analysis.  This broad topic encompasses many ancillary issues includ-
ing model validation procedures, uncertainty in test data and analysis models, probabilistic techniques for test-analysis corre-
lation, verification of the mathematical formulation, and establishment of appropriate qualification requirements.  This paper 
will focus on certification requirements for crashworthiness of military helicopters; capabilities of the current analysis codes 
used for crash modeling and simulation, including some examples of simulations from the literature to illustrate the current 
approach to model validation; and future directions needed to achieve “crash certification by analysis.”  
 
Introduction 
 
The rationale for incorporating crashworthy design fea-
tures into rotorcraft is to minimize the number of fatalities 
and serious injuries experienced by the crew and troops, 
and to reduce the amount of structural damage to the air-
frame and payload during a severe, but survivable, crash.  
Ideally, the initial cost and weight associated with incor-
porating crashworthy design features are offset by cost 
savings associated with the reduced number of injuries 
and lower levels of aircraft damage.  Crashworthy design 
of rotorcraft requires a systems approach in which various 
subcomponents work together to absorb and dissipate the 
kinetic energy of impact.  During a crash, the helicopter 
must limit the loads and decelerations that are transferred 
to the occupants to humanly tolerable levels, usually 
through crushable landing gear, energy absorbing sub-
floors, and load-limiting seats.  Structural collapse of fu-
selage frames and other structural components used to 
support the overhead rotor and transmission mass must be 
prevented, thereby providing a livable volume for the 
occupant.  The seats, restraint systems, seat track, and 
floor provide a secure tie down in the crashworthy heli-
copter, thus preventing the occupant from becoming a 
projectile inside the fuselage during a crash.  In addition, 
head strike potential should be mitigated or eliminated 
through the use of pre-tensioned restraint systems and/or 
cockpit airbags.  Occupant survivability also depends on 
eliminating post-crash fire hazards and providing for 
emergency egress.  The crashworthy helicopter must be 
capable of all these things while experiencing high transi-
tory, multi-directional decelerations associated with im-
pact onto different terrains. 
  
 
_______________________________________ 
Presented at the American Helicopter Society 62nd An-
nual Forum, Phoenix, AZ, May 9-11, 2006. This paper is 
a work of the US Government and is, therefore, in the 
public domain. 
Historically, MIL-STD-1290A (AV) [1] defined the certi-
fication requirements for crash performance of military 
helicopters by specifying a list of lateral, vertical, longitu-
dinal, and combined velocity impact conditions that the 
airframe must withstand with minimal collapse and asso-
ciated loss of volume (15% or less).   The military stan-
dard encouraged the designer to demonstrate compliance 
with the requirements by using analytical methods.  How-
ever, the standard also states that: “Instrumented full-scale 
crash test(s) are desirable to substantiate the capability of 
the aircraft system to prevent fatalities and minimize inju-
ries during crashes of the severity cited herein.  If the sys-
tem testing is not conducted, then analysis shall be re-
quired to show that the individual components and sub-
systems function together effectively to achieve the spe-
cific overall level of crashworthiness.”  Thus, the military 
standard established both full-scale crash testing and ana-
lytical modeling as tools to achieve crash certification.  
  
The purpose of this paper is to discuss certification or 
qualification of helicopter crashworthiness by analysis.  
The terms ‘certification’ and ‘qualification’ are used in-
terchangeably in the paper and they are defined as “con-
firmation that a design requirement or military specifica-
tion has been met or achieved.”  The paper begins with a 
brief review of crash safety requirements for military 
helicopters.  Next, a summary of modeling and analysis 
procedures is provided.  In order to assess the accuracy of 
crash simulations, examples are summarized in which the 
codes are used to simulate full-scale aircraft crash tests.  
Finally, future directions needed to achieve “crash certifi-
cation by analysis,” are discussed in two subsections: De-
sign Requirements and Improved Analytical Methods. 
 
Brief Review of Crash Safety Requirements 
 
Military helicopter design requirements for crashworthi-
ness were developed by close examination of U.S. Army 
accident data during two different studies.  The first study 
reviewed all accident data for rotary- and light fixed-wing 
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aircraft that occurred between July 1960 and June 1965.  
During a second study, attack and cargo helicopter acci-
dents that occurred from January 1971 through December 
1976 were studied.  The data from these studies were ex-
amined to determine the velocity changes in the vertical 
and longitudinal directions at impact for survivable 
crashes.  The results of the study showed that the 95th 
percentile of all survivable accidents occurred at less than 
42 ft/s vertical and 50 ft/s longitudinal impact velocities.  
Analysis of the data also showed similarity between ro-
tary- and light fixed-wing aircraft.  Consequently, the 
same criteria were used to qualify both types of aircraft.   
In general, there were insufficient data to determine a 
lateral velocity distribution.  Thus, a representative value 
of 30 ft/s lateral velocity was selected.  Later, reductions 
were made in the longitudinal velocity change and in the 
attitude angles based on economic factors and operational 
constraints. However, the vertical and lateral velocity 
requirements were unchanged. 
 
The findings from the two studies mentioned previously 
and many additional investigations into the safety and 
survivability of Army helicopters led to the development 
of the Crash Survival Design Guide in 1965, which was a 
compilation of a series of reports on accident analyses, 
full-scale crash test data, proposed design criteria, and 
prototype crashworthy systems.  Since then, the Guide has 
been updated and expanded several times to encompass 
the increasing knowledge gained from continuing re-
search in rotorcraft crashworthiness.  Today, the latest 
edition of the Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide [2], 
published in 1989, consists of five volumes. 
 
Information contained in the Crash Survival Design 
Guide was used in the development of Military Standard 
MIL-STD-1290A (AV) for Light Fixed and Rotary-Wing 
Aircraft Crash Resistance [1], which establishes minimum 
crash resistance criteria for implementation in the initial 
stages of aircraft system design.  The initial release of the 
standard was in January 1974, and it was subsequently 
revised in September 1988. In the late 1980’s, an Aero-
nautical Design Standard ADS-36 for Rotary Wing Air-
craft Crash Resistance [3] was developed specifically for 
qualifying the U.S. Army’s new reconnaissance and at-
tack helicopter, the RAH-66, which eventually became 
the Comanche helicopter.  The ADS-36 contains similar 
information as the MIL-STD-1290A (AV); however, 
some of the criteria were modified so that the RAH-66 
would be designed with crash resistance equivalent to the 
existing UH-60 Black Hawk.  For the discussions in this 
paper, the crash requirements in the military standard will 
be described. 
 
MIL-STD-1290A (AV) contains seven different specifi-
cations for aircraft crashworthiness, as listed in Table 1.  
The crash performance requirements for each of these 
impact conditions are summarized in Table 2.   To meet 
the performance requirements, the designer is requested to 
demonstrate the capabilities of the aircraft to withstand 
various velocity change criteria using analytical methods.  
However, the MIL-STD-1290A (AV) does not specify 
which analytical methods or codes should be used to per-
form these analyses.  Separate military specifications for 
landing gear, seats, fuel tanks, and other subsystems are 
also cited in MIL-STD-1290A (AV). 
 
Appendix A in MIL-STD-1290A (AV) lists the testing 
requirements for various aircraft components and subsys-
tems including the fuel system, crew and troop seats, litter 
supports, landing gear, and flammability tests.  The Gen-
eral Requirements section of the military standard states 
that, “The component and subsystem tests described in 
Appendix A are mandatory.  Instrumented full-scale crash 
test(s) are desirable to substantiate the capability of the 
aircraft system to prevent fatalities and minimize injuries 
during crashes of the severity cited herein.  If the system 
testing is not conducted, then analysis shall be required to 
show that the individual components and subsystems 
function together effectively to achieve the specific over-
all level of crashworthiness.” 
 
Table1. Crash Impact Design Conditions, with Landing 
Gear Extended 
 
Condition 
No. 
Impact Direction  
(Aircraft Axes) 
Velocity 
Change 
(ft/s) 
Object/ 
Surface 
Impacted 
1 Longitudinal 
(cockpit) 
20 
2 Longitudinal 
(cabin) 
40 
Rigid  
vertical  
barrier 
3 Vertical* 42  
4 Lateral, Type I 25 
5 Lateral, Type II 30 
6 Combined high 
angle* 
Vertical 
Longitudinal 
 
42 
27 
 
Rigid  
horizontal 
surface 
7 Combined low 
angle 
Vertical 
Longitudinal 
 
14 
100 
 
Plowed 
soil 
 
*For the case of retracted landing gear, the seat and air-
frame combination shall have a vertical crash impact de-
sign velocity change capability of at least 26 ft/s. 
 
Several additional comments should be made regarding 
crash criteria.  More recent studies of military helicopter 
accidents [4-6] show clearly that the “one size fits all” 
approach to crash design criteria is not appropriate.  A 
recommendation from Reference 4 is that “design stan-
dards should be tailored to class or type of aircraft in or-
der to minimize cost and maximize the crash protection 
offered by each type of helicopter.”  A similar recom-
mendation is stated in Reference 5, “cost/benefit trade 
studies should be conducted…to establish the optimum 
required design crash velocity.”  In addition, Reference 6 
recommends a “variable crash resistance design criteria 
for military helicopters as a function of their size, main 
rotor blade disk loading, rotor blade inertia, autorotative 
rate of descent, and mission type.”  Data contained in 
References 4 through 7 indicate that more recent accident 
studies show that a significant change has occurred in the 
kinematics of military helicopter crashes.  As new and 
improved crashworthy design features have been intro-
duced over time, the data show that survivable helicopter 
accidents are occurring at higher impact velocities.  Con-
sequently, since crash design requirements are based on 
accident statistics, it is important to update the statistical 
data on a regular basis.  Likewise, the design require-
ments should be re-evaluated periodically to ensure their 
validity and relevance. 
It is important to note that there are no requirements for 
full-scale crash testing of civil rotorcraft, similar to MIL-
STD-1290A (AV) or ADS-36.  Instead, there are seat 
requirements described in the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions, Parts 27 and 29, for normal and transport civil ro-
torcraft (see References 8 and 9).  These criteria are 
summarized in Reference 10, and comparisons of military 
and civil requirements are presented in References 11 and 
12.  In general, the findings show that civil helicopters 
typically crash at consistently lower velocities than do 
military helicopters.  Consequently, applying the military 
standard to civil helicopters is not appropriate.  
 
Finally, MIL-STD-1290A (AV) was canceled by the US 
Department of Defense in the mid-1990’s to give defense 
contractors more freedom to develop creative and innova-
tive designs without the constraints provided by the mili-
tary standards. 
 
Table 2. Performance Requirements for Crash Design Conditions 
 
Impact Direction Performance Requirement 
Longitudinal - Cockpit 
(∆Vx) 
The designer shall demonstrate analytically that the basic airframe is capable of impacting lon-
gitudinally into a rigid vertical barrier at a constant velocity of 20 ft/s without crushing the pilot 
or copilot stations to an extent that would either preclude evacuation of the aircraft or preclude 
a livable volume for the aircraft occupants.  For this impact, the engines, transmission, and rotor 
system shall remain intact. 
Longitudinal - Cabin 
(∆Vx) 
The basic airframe’s capability to impact longitudinally into a rigid vertical barrier or wall at a 
constant velocity of 40 ft/s without reducing the length of the passenger/troop compartment by 
more than 15% shall be demonstrated analytically.  Any consequent inward buckling of walls, 
floor, and/or roof shall not be hazardous to the occupants and/or restrict their evacuation. 
Vertical (∆Vz) The designer shall analytically demonstrate the capability of the aircraft system, with ro-
tor/wing lift equal to structural design gross weight (SDGW) and with landing gear extended, to 
withstand vertical impacts of 42 ft/s on a rigid horizontal surface without (1) reducing the 
height of the cockpit and troop compartment by no more than 15%, and (2) allowing the occu-
pants to experience injurious accelerative loading.  For the case of retracted landing gear, the 
designer shall analytically demonstrate the capability of the aircraft to withstand impacts of 26 
ft/s on a rigid horizontal surface with the same requirements as for the gear extended case.  The 
capabilities, with gear up or down, are required for all aircraft orientation (attitudes) upon im-
pact in +15° to -5° pitch and ±10° roll. 
Lateral (∆Vy) The designer shall analytically demonstrate the capability of the aircraft to withstand lateral 
impacts of 25 ft/s for Type I and 30 ft/s for Type II aircraft without reducing the width of the 
occupied areas by more that 15%.  Precautions should be taken to minimize the chances that the 
occupants, including their extremities, could become trapped between the structure and any 
impacting surfaces following failure of doors, canopies, or hatches. 
Combined The designer shall analytically demonstrate the capability of the aircraft with 1 SDGW ro-
tor/wing lift and with landing gear extended to withstand the following combined impacts with-
out a reduction of the cockpit or cabin compartments that would seriously injure the occupants: 
(1) a combined impact onto a rigid horizontal surface with vertical and longitudinal velocity 
changes of 42 and 27 ft/s, and (2) a combined impact onto plowed soil with vertical and longi-
tudinal velocity changes of 14 and 100 ft/s, respectively. 
 
Modeling and Analysis Procedures 
 
As noted earlier, the military standard for crash resistance, 
MIL-STD-1290A (AV), clearly states the intent for the 
designer to demonstrate compliance with the various ve-
locity change requirements through analytical methods.  
There were likely two main reasons for encouraging  the 
use of analytical methods.  First, crash testing of full-scale 
aircraft, especially prototype aircraft, is relatively expen-
sive.  Also, due to the limited availability and high cost of 
test articles, it is generally not feasible to perform re-
peated tests or a large number of tests for different impact 
conditions.  Secondly, the timeframe for the initial publi-
cation of the military standard in the mid 1970’s corre-
sponded with the initial release of KRASH, a kinematic 
lumped-spring-mass crash analysis code [13-14].  During 
this same time period, a new code, DYNA3D [15], was 
being developed at Lawrence Livermore National Labs 
under sponsorship by the Department of Energy.  
DYNA3D was an explicit transient dynamic finite ele-
ment code capable of simulating high-speed impacts.  
Later, the public domain version of DYNA3D was ob-
tained by commercial vendors who made modifications 
and now market commercial versions such as 
MSC.Dytran [16] and LS-DYNA [17], to name a couple 
of the many spin-offs.  To assess the current state-of-the-
art in computational methods for crash analysis, it is im-
portant to understand the capabilities of each of the com-
monly used codes.  Thus, brief descriptions of KRASH, 
MSC.Dytran, and LS-DYNA are provided in the follow-
ing subsections. 
 
KRASH 
The Lockheed-California Company developed KRASH 
[13-14] under initial sponsorship by the U.S. Army in 
1974.  The FAA later supported further development of 
the code.  The most recent public domain version of the 
program to be released was KRASH85.  The KRASH 
program predicts the response of vehicles to multidirec-
tional crash environments. Structural models are devel-
oped from massless interconnecting beam elements, con-
centrated rigid body masses, and spring elements.  The 
beams represent the stiffness characteristics of the struc-
ture between the masses.  Plastic deformation is ac-
counted for through stiffness reductions.  The masses can 
translate and rotate under the influence of external forces 
including gravity, aerodynamic, and impact forces; as 
well as the constraint provided by internal element forces.  
Impact forces are introduced into the model through 
nonlinear external springs attached to the masses.  Spring 
stiffness must be input as a force-deflection table that may 
be determined through component testing or independent 
finite element analysis prior to conducting the KRASH 
analysis.  
 
A commercial version of KRASH is available from Dy-
namic Response Incorporated (DRI-KRASH).  DRI-
KRASH contains several upgrades to the KRASH85 ver-
sion including (1) a water impact algorithm, (2) a landing 
gear module, and (3) a severity index for predicting head 
injury.  In addition, the DRI-KRASH code contains an 
improved pre-processor for model generation and a post-
processor for data reduction.  
  
In general, KRASH models are relatively easy to put to-
gether, though considerable engineering judgment is re-
quired to define the beam stiffness properties.  The mod-
els are relatively small, consisting of only a few beam 
elements, masses, and springs, and, consequently, they 
execute quickly on a personal computer.  KRASH simula-
tions rely heavily on experimental data as input to define 
spring stiffness properties.   For example, spring elements 
might be used to represent the crushing response of the 
subfloor/tub section or the crushable stage in a landing 
gear.  Component crush test data are used to define the 
load-deflection response of the springs. 
 
MSC.Dytran 
MSC.Dytran [16] is a three-dimensional, explicit finite 
element code capable of analyzing high-speed problems 
involving large deformation of structures and solids.  The 
original DYNA3D command structure was modified such 
that the command structure of MSC.Dytran is similar to 
NASTRAN [18].  MSC.Dytran has the capability to 
model non-uniform gas dynamics and fluid-structure in-
teractions.  It does this by coupling a Lagrangian proces-
sor for structural modeling with an Eulerian processor for 
modeling the gas dynamics.  In addition, MSC.Dytran 
offers contact elements to handle sliding and frictional 
contact of structural elements.  The code has been com-
mercially available since 1992 and has been applied to 
several problems related to high-speed impact such as 
airbag analysis, ballistics, blast vulnerability, blast con-
tainment, ship collision, bird strike, and helicopter crash-
worthiness.  
 
LS-DYNA 
LS-DYNA [17] is a general-purpose finite element code 
for analyzing the large deformation dynamic response of 
structures including structures coupled with fluids.  The 
main solution methodology is based on explicit time inte-
gration.  An implicit solver is also available.  A wide va-
riety of contact definitions are available including self-
contact, surface-to-surface contact, and node-to-surface 
contact.  Spatial discretization is achieved by the use of 
eight-node solid elements, two-node beam elements, 
three- and four-node shell elements, truss elements, mem-
brane elements, discrete elements, and rigid bodies.  LS-
DYNA currently contains over one hundred constitutive 
models and ten equations-of-state to cover a wide range 
of material behavior.  Fluid-structure interaction problems 
are simulated using Arbitrary Euler-Lagrange (ALE) cou-
pling.  Recently, a Smooth Particle Hydrodynamic (SPH) 
method was added to provide additional “hydrocode” 
capabilities.  LS-DYNA is operational on a large number 
of mainframes, workstations, and PC’s, and can be exe-
cuted using shared memory processors (SMP), or with 
multiple parallel processors (MPP).   
 
Illustrative Examples of Test and Analysis Correlation 
 
In order to assess the fidelity and accuracy of analytical 
codes, examples are summarized in which the codes de-
scribed previously are used to simulate a full-scale crash 
test.  In general, rigorous mathematical methods have not 
been used to correlate crash test data and analytical pre-
dictions, even though a great deal of research is being 
performed to develop these methods, both in the time and 
frequency domain.  In general, analysts typically use 
global parameters to evaluate the level of correlation, 
such as overall deformation and timeline of events, com-
parison of acceleration and velocity results, and prediction 
of discrete structural failures. These illustrative examples 
highlight typical simulations performed by the authors 
and others.  They are provided to demonstrate the applica-
tion and complexity of the various approaches, as well as 
some of the limitations in the predictive capability. 
 
KRASH Simulation of the Sikorsky ACAP Helicopter 
Since KRASH was developed under sponsorship by the 
U.S. Army and was initially released at approximately the 
same time as the military standard for crash resistance, it 
is appropriate to assume that the U.S. Army would en-
courage the use of this code by defense contractors in 
developing new aircraft and would accept KRASH simu-
lation results as proof of crash performance.   An example 
will be illustrated.   In the late 1970’s, the U.S. Army ini-
tiated the Advanced Composite Airframe Program 
(ACAP) [19-23].  The purpose of the ACAP was to dem-
onstrate the potential of advanced composite materials to 
save weight and cost in airframe structures while achiev-
ing systems compatibility and meeting Army require-
ments for vulnerability reduction, reliability, maintain-
ability, and crash resistance.  In 1981, the US Army 
awarded separate contracts to Bell Helicopter Textron and 
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation to develop, manufacture, 
and test helicopters constructed primarily of advanced 
composite materials.  Each company manufactured three 
airframes that were tested under a variety of static and 
dynamic conditions to demonstrate compliance with the 
program objectives. Crash tests of the Bell and Sikorsky 
ACAP static test articles were conducted in 1987 to dem-
onstrate their impact performance and to verify compli-
ance with crash requirements [21], [23].      
   
The Sikorsky-developed KRASH model of their ACAP 
helicopter is shown in Figure 1(a), along with a photo-
graph of the test article, shown in Figure 1(b).  The model 
was developed to aid in the early design process [20].   It 
consisted of 53 discrete masses, 23 spring elements, 75 
beam elements, and 44 nodes.  The spring elements were 
used to represent the tires and landing gear stages.  The 
impact test was performed at 38 ft/s vertical velocity, with 
an impact attitude of 10° pitch and 10° roll.  The test con-
ditions did not match the MIL-STD-1290A (AV) re-
quirements; however, the vertical velocity selected for the 
test matched the vertical velocity requirement in ADS-36. 
 
The correlation between drop test data and the pre-test 
KRASH simulation is presented in three categories in 
Reference [21].   First, a timeline comparison is discussed 
that shows the timing of key events, such as initial right 
landing gear contact, left gear contact, nose gear contact, 
initiation of honeycomb stroking in the gears, and fuse-
lage contact.  The correlation of the timing of these events 
is very good.  Next, comparisons of force and displace-
ment responses of the landing gear are shown.  These 
correlations are also excellent.  Finally, the acceleration 
responses of the rotorcraft transmission mass, engines, 
and occupants are presented.  The test-analysis correlation 
of the vertical acceleration response of the main transmis-
sion mass is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 (a) KRASH model. 
 
 
(b) Photograph of the 1987 drop test. 
 
Figure 1. Sikorsky ACAP model and test article. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of the vertical acceleration response 
of the rotor transmission mass. 
 
This example is just one of many that could be illustrated 
in which KRASH predictions showed excellent correla-
tion with test data, especially in predicting the responses 
of landing gear, engines, and rotor transmission masses.  
Part of the explanation for the high level of agreement is 
the fact that experimental data are used in defining the 
properties of spring elements that make up the model.  In 
the case of the Sikorsky ACAP, the landing gear proper-
ties had been determined from a prior drop test of the 
landing gear alone [22].  Also, the model was developed 
such that the inertial properties of the test article, i.e. total 
weight and center-of-gravity location, were matched ex-
actly.  Given these factors, one would expect that the re-
sponse of the high mass items such as the engines and 
rotor transmission mass would be well predicted.  Once a 
model, such as the Sikorsky ACAP helicopter model, is 
validated, it can be used to predict the response of the 
airframe to a variety of other impact conditions.  The 
FAA and Cranfield Impact Centre have been cataloging 
existing KRASH models of different aircraft for use in the 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Tool (AAIT) [24].  Crash 
investigators use AAIT to simulate and reconstruct air-
craft crashes as part of the accident investigation.  The 
AAIT software package integrates the KRASH structural 
analysis code with the SOMTA [25] occupant simulation 
code into a single environment.  AAIT output includes 
prediction of overall aircraft motion, sequence of break-
up, contact marks, forces on occupants, etc. 
 
MSC.Dytran Model of the Sikorsky ACAP Helicopter 
Next, an MSC.Dytran simulation of a full-scale crash test 
of a composite prototype helicopter, the Sikorsky ACAP, 
is highlighted [26-32]. In 1997, a full-scale crash test of 
the Sikorsky ACAP residual flight test article was con-
ducted specifically to generate experimental data for cor-
relation with the MSC.Dytran simulation.  An existing 
modal-vibration model of the Sikorsky ACAP helicopter 
was obtained and converted into a model suitable for the 
impact simulations.  An external user-defined subroutine 
was developed to represent the complex landing gear re-
sponse.  Analytical predictions of the sequence of events, 
structural damage, subfloor crushing, and the acceleration 
responses of the airframe and large mass items such as the 
engines and rotor transmission were correlated with the 
experimental data to validate the crash simulation.   
 
Side and three-quarter views of the helicopter model and 
impact surface are shown in Figure 3.  The final helicop-
ter model consisted of 4,000 nodes and 7,000 elements, 
including 3,000 beam and rod elements, 3,000 quadrilat-
eral shell elements, and 1,000 triangular shell elements.  
The impact surface was represented using 250 solid ele-
ments.  Thirty-four different material property cards were 
used to represent a variety of composite laminates.  A 
master-surface to slave-node contact was defined between 
the structural model and the impact surface. 
 
To perform the simulation, a two-stage modeling ap-
proach was employed in which a rigid structural model of 
the helicopter was executed during deformation of the 
landing gear.  At 0.045 seconds before fuselage contact, 
the x-, y-, and z-locations of all grid points and the corre-
sponding nodal velocities in the rigid model were output 
to a file.  These initial conditions were then input as the 
starting point of the flexible model simulation.   This 
rigid-to-flexible approach was used to significantly de-
crease the CPU time required to complete the simulation, 
and because the rigid model made the introduction of the 
pitch angular velocity easier.  The modeling approach is 
described more fully in Reference 28. 
 
x
y
 
(a) Side view. 
 
 (b) Three-quarter view. 
 
Figure 3. MSC.Dytran model of the Sikorsky ACAP helicopter. 
 
A full-scale crash test of the Sikorsky ACAP flight test 
article was conducted in June 1999 [27].  For the crash 
test, the aircraft was outfitted with two crew and two 
troop seats and four instrumented anthropomorphic dum-
mies.  The measured test conditions were 38-ft/s vertical 
and 32.5-ft/s horizontal velocity onto a rigid impact sur-
face with 6.25° nose-up pitch and 3.5° left-down roll atti-
tude.  A pitching angular velocity of 9.6°/s (increasing 
nose-up) at impact was measured from film analysis.  
Approximately 120 channels of data from the airframe, 
seats, and dummy occupants were collected at 10,000 
samples per second. Pre- and post-test photographs are 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
(a) Pre-test photograph. 
 
 
(b) Post-test photograph. 
 
Figure 4. Pre- and post-test photographs of the Sikorsky 
ACAP residual flight-test hardware. 
 
The test-analysis correlation of the full-scale crash test of 
the Sikorsky ACAP helicopter consisted of a comparison 
of a timeline of major events, a comparison of predicted 
and observed structural damage, and acceleration and 
velocity time history comparisons at nine different loca-
tions on the airframe.  In general, reasonably good agree-
ment was obtained.  The simulation predicted the location 
and amount of maximum crushing in the subfloor and 
failure of one of the beams used to support the rotor 
transmission overhead mass.  The simulation predicted 
the timing of major events within ±0.007 seconds.  How-
ever, because a two-stage modeling approach was used in 
which the structural model was simulated using rigid ma-
terial properties for the first 0.045 s, the failure of the tail, 
seen in Figure 4(b), was not well predicted.  Comparisons 
of selected test and analysis filtered acceleration re-
sponses are plotted in Figure 5.   These results show rea-
sonable correlation, though the magnitude and/or timing 
of the peak accelerations may not agree exactly. 
 
The modeling of the Sikorsky ACAP full-scale crash test 
illustrated several important issues regarding the success-
ful application of nonlinear, explicit finite element codes.  
The first issue involved modeling of the landing gear.  
Considerable time was spent attempting to couple a 
mechanistic model of the landing gear to the finite ele-
ment model of the airframe.  Problems arose in trying to 
align the gears and to mitigate the large spike in force that 
was input into the finite element model at impact. 
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Figure 5. Comparisons of selected vertical accelera-
tion responses for the ACAP crash test. 
 
A two-stage modeling approach was implemented for this 
simulation that worked well.  However, improved meth-
ods are needed to allow coupling of a mechanistic model 
of a landing gear with a full FEM of an aircraft or 
helicopter.   Another issue involved modeling of 
composite material failure. Fairly simplistic failure 
models, such as maximum stress and/or maximum strain 
were used.  Recently, the capabilities for modeling 
composite material failure using explicit transient 
dynamic codes have greatly improved.  Finally, the 
transition from a modal-vibration NASTRAN model to an 
explicit nonlinear transient dynamic model was not easily 
accomplished and required several months’ effort.  Many 
of the material property definitions did not translate.  In 
the modal-vibration model, all inertial properties were 
simulated using concentrated masses.  Consequently, new 
material cards had to be defined for the MSC.Dytran 
simulation including material density.  Since the mesh of 
the original modal-vibration model was too detailed in 
some regions and too coarse in other regions, 
considerable rediscretization was required.  In general, the 
process of converting one type of model, e.g. a structural 
loads or modal-vibration model, into a crash simulation 
model is not an easy or straightforward task. 
 
LS-DYNA Fluid-Structure Interaction Simulation 
In this section, an LS-DYNA simulation of a vertical drop 
test of a composite fuselage section performed onto water 
is highlighted. Understanding multi-terrain impacts and 
how to model them is important because helicopters 
rarely crash onto hard prepared surfaces.  
 
The U.S. Navy is concerned with the crash safety of its 
helicopter fleet due to the large number of crashes that 
occur on water.  As a result, the Navy has sponsored re-
search programs to improve the crash safety of rotorcraft 
during water impacts.  In general, the structural response 
and load transfer mechanisms for water and soft soil im-
pacts are much different than those on hard surfaces.  
Also, very little research exists on the crashworthy re-
sponse of helicopters impacting into water as opposed to 
hard surfaces.  The MIL-STD-1290A (AV) does not con-
tain any specifications for water impact.  However, the 
Navy does have water-ditching requirements.  References 
33 through 38 describe a few recent research studies in-
volving simulations of water and soft soil impact.  An 
example of one of these studies, documented in Reference 
35, is summarized below. 
 
A 25-ft/s vertical drop test of a 5-ft. diameter, 5-ft. long 
composite fuselage section [40] was conducted into a 3.5-
ft. deep, 15-ft. diameter pool of water.  The empty fuse-
lage section weighed 208 pounds.  The fuselage section, 
outfitted with instrumentation, seat rails, and ten 100-lb. 
lead masses attached to the floor, weighed approximately 
1,200 pounds.  A photograph of the composite fuselage 
section is shown in Figure 6(a).  A frame from a video 
taken during the water impact test is shown in Figure 
6(b).   
  
(a) Pre-test photo. 
 
 
 (b) Photograph taken just after impact. 
 
Figure 6. Photographs of the composite fuselage section 
and drop test. 
 
Post-test examination of the subfloor region revealed ex-
tensive damage to the outer skin.  The center portion of all 
five foam blocks that were designed for energy absorption 
for a rigid surface impact showed no sign of crushing, and 
there was also very little debonding of the face sheets 
from the foam.  A post-test view of the bottom of the sec-
tion taken from the front is shown in Figure 7, in which 
the five foam blocks in the subfloor can be distinguished.  
The unsupported areas of the outer skin between the foam 
blocks showed the most damage.  No damage was ob-
served to the floor and upper fuselage cabin region. 
 
A number of different LS-DYNA models were created to 
represent the air and water fluid regions.  Both rectangular 
and cylindrical Euler meshes were created, and the size of 
the mesh was varied from constant 3 and 6-inch cubic 
meshes to a refined 1-in. mesh with a gradient.  Also, a 
smooth particle hydrodynamic (SPH) model of the water 
was developed in LS-DYNA.  Although the SPH model 
gave good results, it was somewhat slow in execution.  A 
description of the various water models and their resultant 
predictions can be found in Reference 35.  The LS-DYNA 
coupled fluid structural algorithm (ALE/Euler) has the 
capability to allow the bottom skin of the fuselage, which 
is the coupling surface, to fail.  Models with and without 
failure of the bottom fuselage skin were created and com-
pared. 
     
 
 
Figure 7. Post-test photograph of the bottom of the fuse-
lage showing damage.  The four dark regions are areas 
between the foam blocks. 
In order to study the failure of the bottom skin, an LS-
DYNA model was created with a refined 1-in fluid mesh 
directly under the section, which became coarser further 
from the section, as shown in Figure 8(a).  The failure 
strain was set on the material card for the bottom fiber-
glass skin to allow the elements to fail after a given strain 
is reached.  As failed elements were deleted, holes formed 
in the bottom surface that allowed the water to flow 
through the failed skin.  The failure of the bottom skin is 
shown in Figure 8(b) for 0.01 seconds after impact.  The 
figure shows the bottom skin of the fuselage viewed from 
an angle from above.  In this case, the failure strain was 
set to 2 percent, which is a practical value for an angle-ply 
fiberglass laminate.  The results show that the outer skin 
between the foam blocks fails catastrophically allowing 
the water to flow through as shown in the right side of the 
figure.  Although the failure is dramatic, the initial peak 
accelerations were only reduced by a small amount from 
the original model without failure as shown in Figure 9.  
Note that both the analysis and test data were filtered with 
a low-pass filter.  Since the run times for these models are 
long, the model with failure was only executed long 
enough to capture the fundamental pulse; i.e., 0.04 sec-
onds.  The amount of damage predicted by this simulation 
was more severe than observed.  
Acceleration responses are shown in Figure 9 at two loca-
tions for LS-DYNA simulations with and without failure 
of the bottom skin.  The acceleration pulses with failure 
of the bottom skin drop off too quickly after the initial 
peak due to the excessive failure.  Since the actual strain-
to-failure data for the angle-ply laminate was not avail-
able, the objective of specifying a failure strain was to 
determine the effect of failure on the simulation.  Also, 
note that when the failure strain criterion was met, the 
elements were deleted.  Other failure options available in 
LS-DYNA such as “constrained tied nodes failure” were 
not evaluated, but may reduce the severity of the damage.  
A finer mesh would be another option; however, a mesh-
density study of the bottom skin was not performed.  
When failure strains were applied to this model, water did 
flow through the areas formed by the deleted failed ele-
ments.  However, partially due to the coarse elements in 
the bottom skin, the failure was more severe in the model 
than observed in the test. 
 
(a) Gradient mesh. 
 
(b) Lower skin failures. 
 
Figure 8.  Front view of a slice of the gradient-mesh. 
 
Future Directions  
 
The future directions needed to achieve crash certification 
by analysis are discussed in this section and they are di-
vided into two subsections: 1. Crash Qualification Re-
quirements and 2. Improved Analytical Methods.  
 
Crash Qualification Requirements 
It is highly recommended that the U.S. military establish a 
new military standard for crash resistance of rotary wing 
aircraft.  This standard should focus on a systems ap-
proach to crashworthiness [6], [41] in which subcompo-
nents are utilized to lower the acceleration levels transmit-
ted to the occupants to a humanly tolerable level during a 
helicopter crash.  These subcomponents include the land-
ing gear, the subfloor, and the seats.  In addition, the 
cabin structure must be designed with the proper stiffness 
and strength to maintain a livable volume for the occu-
pants, to prevent failure of the seat attachments, and to 
retain the high mass items such as the rotor transmission 
and engine.  Interior hazards such as the flight control 
stick and instrument panel should be minimized by pro-
viding adequate restraint systems and/or using cockpit 
airbags.   Finally, post-crash hazards should be mitigated, 
allowing efficient occupant egress.   These items were 
included in MIL-STD-1290A (AV) and should be in-
cluded in any new proposed standards.  However, upon 
reviewing MIL-STD-1290A (AV), it is apparent that the 
performance requirements are written to specify limits on 
reduction in cabin volume.  There are no specifications 
for human tolerance to impact loading.  If a new qualifi-
cation standard is written, it should include performance 
requirements that ensure occupant survivability, such as 
limits on Head Injury Criteria (less than 1000), lumbar 
loading (less than 1,500 lbs.), and Dynamic Response 
Index of 20 or less based upon seat pan vertical accelera-
tion responses, and comparison of occupant acceleration 
responses with the whole body acceleration tolerance 
curves developed by Eiband.  A complete assessment of 
these occupant injury criteria is described in Reference 
32. 
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Figure 9.  Filtered experimental acceleration responses 
compared with LS-DYNA predicted inboard accelerations 
with and without failure of the bottom fiberglass skin. 
In addition, crash qualification criteria should be written 
requiring multi-terrain impact testing and simulation.  The 
accident data indicate that 80% of all helicopter crashes 
occur on multi-terrain including soil and water [33].  Con-
sequently, the importance of multi-terrain cannot be ig-
nored, especially when research studies have shown that 
helicopters, designed for crash resistance onto hard sur-
faces, do not perform well during multi-terrain impacts 
[34-35, 37-39].  Also, landing gear are completely inef-
fective as energy absorbers during water impact.  The 
requirement for multi-terrain crash resistance would in-
crease the need for novel energy absorbing structural de-
sign concepts.  In addition, external devices such as air 
bag systems could be used to augment the crash perform-
ance of helicopters during water or soft soil impacts. 
 
To be effective and minimize cost and weight, a variable 
design requirement must be written based on helicopter 
type, mission, weight, and autorotative rate of descent [6].  
The military standard defines one set of design criteria for 
all military helicopters.  However, accident data show that 
it is easier for medium- to large-size helicopters to meet 
the requirement than it is for small-size helicopters.  
There is also the issue of weight penalty associated with 
crash design features.  The “one-size-fits-all” approach 
penalizes the small-size helicopter because a larger per-
centage of its gross weight is dedicated for crash resis-
tance.  Consequently, a variable design approach is re-
quired that takes into account a helicopter’s type, size, 
mission, and autorotative rate of descent. 
 
Finally, the issue of testing versus analysis must be ad-
dressed.  It is the opinion of the authors that analytical 
methods are not entirely sufficient to qualify or certify 
rotorcraft for crash resistance at this time.  Therefore, it is 
recommended that at least one full-scale crash test be per-
formed for qualification purposes.  The test should be 
conducted with combined vertical and forward velocity 
components and should be performed onto an impact sur-
face that would be most representative of the type of crash 
the helicopter would likely experience in the field, based 
on its mission.   The crash test would serve to qualify the 
helicopter and would provide test data for validation of a 
three-dimensional finite element simulation.  Conse-
quently, the test article should be outfitted with seats, 
dummies, and restraint systems, and any other system that 
is intended for occupant protection.  The helicopter 
should be instrumented to accomplish both tasks, i.e. cer-
tification for crashworthiness and test-analysis correla-
tion.  Once the model is validated for the test condition, a 
probabilistic analysis should be executed to determine 
other possible impact conditions or surfaces where the 
aircraft might be vulnerable, i.e., the validated model 
should be utilized to perform a complete vulnerability/risk 
assessment of the design. 
 
Improved Analytical Methods 
Attendees of the Workshop on Computational Methods 
for Crashworthiness [42], held September 2-3, 1992, at 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, 
were asked to identify key technology needs for improved 
crash modeling and simulation.  Their list is grouped un-
der five main headings including (1) understanding the 
physical phenomena associated with crash events, (2) 
high-fidelity modeling of the vehicle and the occupant 
during crash, (3) efficient computational strategies, (4) 
test methods, measurement techniques, and scaling laws, 
and (5) validation of numerical simulations.  Since many 
of the key technology needs identified during the work-
shop are still valid today, the list is reprinted from Refer-
ence [42]. 
 
(1) Understanding the Physical Phenomena Associated 
with Crash  
This includes understanding (a) the mechanics of large 
dynamic deformations of structures including the effects 
of frictional contact; (b) the effects of inertial forces and 
of material strain rate sensitivity on the dynamic re-
sponse; and (c) damage initiation and progression during 
crash.  For the occupant, the factors that can be corre-
lated with the level of injury or death (e.g., dynamic re-
sponse index, head injury criteria, force in lumbar spinal 
region) need to be identified.  The modeling details re-
quired to capture the different phenomena associated with 
the structural response during crash need to be identified. 
 
(2) High-Fidelity Modeling of Vehicle and Occupant 
The reliability of the predictions of the response of the 
structure and occupant during crash is critically depend-
ent on: (a) the accurate characterization and modeling of 
material behavior; (b) high-fidelity modeling of the criti-
cal details of the vehicle and occupant (e.g. seat, fasten-
ers, and the human anatomy); (c) modeling of the fric-
tional contact between the vehicle and the impact surface, 
and between the different parts of the vehicle, including 
the need for accurate material constitutive models and 
properties for foam, padding, and textiles, especially the 
strain rate sensitivities, for modeling of the seat/occupant 
interaction. 
 
(3) Efficient Computational Strategies 
The effective use of numerical simulations for predicting 
the vehicle response during crash requires strategies for 
treating phenomena occurring at disparate spatial and 
time scales, using reasonable computer resources.  The 
strategies are to be based on using hierarchical (multiple) 
mathematical models in different regions on the vehicle to 
take advantage of the efficiencies gained by matching the 
model to the expected response in each region.  To 
achieve the full potential of hierarchical modeling there 
should be minimum reliance on a priori assumptions 
about the response.  This is accomplished by adding 
adaptivity to the strategy.   
 
(4) Test Methods, Measuring Techniques, and Scaling 
Laws 
The effective coupling of numerical simulations with ex-
periments requires a high degree of interaction between 
the computation analysts and the experimentalists.  This 
is done at three different levels, namely: (1) laboratory 
test on small specimens to obtain material data; (2) com-
ponent test to verify computational models and to deter-
mine empirical structural properties which can be used in 
hybrid experiment/numerical models; and (3) full-scale 
(or scale model) tests to validate the computational model 
and assess the need for model improvements. 
 
New test methods and measurement techniques are 
needed to study progressive failure, as well as soil and 
water impact.  The influence of specimen size or scale 
factor on structural response is not well understood.  
Thus, testing of geometrically similar sub-scale models is 
not possible, until the scaling laws governing the phe-
nomenon are understood.  In particular, scaling laws are 
needed which account for the material behavior including 
elastic properties, failure initiation and ultimate strength, 
structural and topological details, as well as the loading 
characteristics. 
 
(5) Validation of Numerical Simulations 
In addition to validating the numerical simulations by 
component and full-scale tests, a number of carefully se-
lected benchmark tests are needed for assessing new 
computational strategies and numerical algorithms, simi-
lar to the MacNeal Harder problems [43] for evaluating 
the robustness and accuracy of finite elements.  These 
benchmark tests would provide a measure of confidence 
in new codes, or added functional capabilities to existing 
codes.  They could also serve as a basis of code compari-
sons for efficiency and accuracy for modeling of impact 
problems involving large structural deformations in short 
time duration. 
 
Some additional tasks need to be addressed if crash simu-
lations are to have a significant impact during the design 
and certification phases of new aircraft.  These include 
development of software for automated model and mesh 
generation, pre- and post-processing software for efficient 
input and reduction of data, advanced visualization tech-
niques, and application of knowledge-based/expert sys-
tems and neural networks to crash simulation.  LS-DYNA 
currently has the ability to perform adaptive meshing; 
however, this capability needs to be more fully aug-
mented, especially for crash simulations.   
 
A method needs to be developed for coupling mechanistic 
models with nonlinear finite element models, e.g. model-
ing of landing gear on aircraft and rotorcraft.  This capa-
bility is needed since the loads generated at the landing 
gear/airframe interface are important and must be ana-
lyzed correctly.  A study was performed to develop a 
method of accurately modeling landing gear in nonlinear 
finite element codes, as documented in Reference 44.  A 
conclusion from the study states, “results of this 
MSC/DYTRAN landing gear modeling effort were very 
good.  However, several concerns still remain.  The per-
formance of the landing gear remains very sensitive to 
small adjustments in the contact algorithm and integration 
time step.  This new method of landing gear modeling has 
not yet been applied to models where either the landing 
gear, the fuselage, or both are modeled with flexibility.” 
 
Improved material modeling is a continuous, ongoing 
need, especially as new materials are developed and ap-
plied.  It is also important that the existing and updated 
material models are well documented.  For example, LS-
DYNA has over one hundred material models available, 
which LSTC implements into the code when requested by 
customers.  However, very little documentation exists to 
guide a new user in choosing the correct material model 
for his application.   One shortfall common to all the 
codes is the lack of a delamination failure capability for 
composite materials.  In general, it is difficult to imple-
ment delamination criteria in nonlinear, explicit transient 
dynamic finite element codes due to the small mesh size 
required.  A small mesh is needed for accurate prediction; 
however, such a mesh may result in a reduction in the 
time step causing computation time to increase substan-
tially.  Also, the dynamic property data needed to predict 
delamination growth under impact conditions are not eas-
ily obtained.  A review of several methods to incorporate 
delamination failure criteria for composites in 
MSC.Dytran is documented in Reference 45. 
 
Finally, a new approach for quantifying test/analysis cor-
relation needs to be developed and utilized.  In the exam-
ples presented in this paper, test-analysis correlation is 
presented as a comparison of structural deformation and 
plots of filtered acceleration time histories.  For the case 
of the MSC.Dytran simulation of the Sikorsky ACAP 
helicopter, the simulation predicted the maximum amount 
of subfloor crushing that was measured post-test.  This 
example represents “good” correlation.  For filtered ac-
celeration time histories, the level of agreement is deter-
mined by comparing the magnitude and timing of the 
peak acceleration, and the pulse duration.   Rarely will the 
analyst see “good” correlation between test and analysis 
in the sense of an absolute match for these three parame-
ters.  In general, the level of correlation is deemed “good 
or reasonable” if these parameters are “in the ball park.”  
Thus, the need to re-evaluate the current crash data analy-
sis and correlation methodologies for use with detailed 
finite element model simulations has been identified [46].  
Recently, a project was initiated at NASA Langley to 
better quantify the accuracy of crash simulation results.  
The motivation for the project, as stated in Reference 46 
was “to document modeling improvements, to evaluate 
design configurations analytically, and to enable certifica-
tion or qualification by analysis.”  
 
Several important findings are repeated from Reference 
46, as follows.  “It is necessary to quantify and understand 
experimental variations, channel-to-channel, for symmet-
ric locations, as well as test-analysis variations.  Future 
crash finite element model development could be expe-
dited by correlation with experimental modal analysis 
results, especially since the modal correlation will depend 
on the accuracy of the global stiffness and mass distribu-
tion of the finite element model.  Also, this approach pro-
vides a second set of data for correlation, which is impor-
tant given that most test articles are destroyed during 
crash testing.”  Continued work is needed to automate 
rigorous test-analysis correlation methodologies to im-
prove and redefine the level of accuracy.  
 
Reference 47 provides an excellent summary of a panel 
discussion on issues and directions of research in the ar-
eas of model updating, predictive quality of computer 
simulations, model validation and uncertainty quantifica-
tion.  This paper raises some pertinent questions, such as 
what model is appropriate for what purpose, and what 
does it take to be predictive?  The authors of Reference 47 
question the validity of calling a model predictive, when it 
has been validated through comparison with a single set 
of test data.  Such a model does not guarantee accuracy of 
predictions for scenarios not represented by the test data.  
The authors of Reference 47 state, “It is our opinion that 
the focus of the research in model validation should be 
shifted from validating deterministic models to validating 
statistically accurate models.”  Such an approach would 
account for variability in the operational and testing envi-
ronment and uncertainties related to manufacturing and 
fabrication tolerances.  Thus, model validation should be 
strongly coupled with uncertainty quantification.  Finally 
the authors of Reference 47 propose five topic areas that 
are “critical to the success of model updating, uncertainty 
quantification, and model validation for linear and nonlin-
ear dynamics.”  These five topic areas are: uncertainty 
quantification, sampling and fast probability integration, 
generation of fast running meta-models, feature extrac-
tion, and statistical hypothesis testing. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has addressed some of the issues associated 
with crash certification by analysis.  In particular, the cer-
tification standard for military helicopters, MIL-STD-
1290A (AV), was discussed.  This standard was cancelled 
by the US Department of Defense in the mid-1990’s and 
one recommendation of this paper is that a similar, though 
more comprehensive standard be established in its place.  
The new standard should include: variable velocity re-
quirements based on helicopter type, mission, weight, and 
autorotative rate of descent; performance requirements for 
occupant injury assessment; requirements for at least one 
full-scale crash test to be performed on the surface (rigid, 
water, or soft soil) that would be most typical, given the 
mission of the helicopter; and development of a finite 
element model of the test article to be used in nonlinear, 
explicit transient dynamic simulations.  The purpose of 
the crash test would be twofold: to certify the helicopter 
for crashworthiness and to provide experimental data for 
test-analysis correlation.  Once the model is validated for 
the test condition, it should be utilized to perform a com-
plete vulnerability/risk assessment of the design. 
The capabilities of existing crash modeling and simula-
tion codes were summarized, and some examples from 
the literature illustrating the current test-analysis correla-
tion procedures were shown.  The authors of the paper 
believe that simulation capabilities are not sufficient at 
this time to achieve crash certification by analysis.  Sev-
eral suggestions for future directions in improved analyti-
cal methods are included in the paper. 
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